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Protecting Europe’s content production from US giants 
This article investigates and compares the changes to both the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive and the Copyright Directive, through which European Union 
policymakers have sought to protect European content producers, mainly in the 
face of competition from US-based platforms. Contributing to debates about plat-
form and content regulation, we examine the approaches taken with these two leg-
islative changes and assess the potential for success of the most recent efforts. Ul-
timately, we argue that if revised as proposed the Copyright Directive runs the risk 
of further adding to the imbalance of power between press publishers and online 
platforms, and that the level playing field approach taken in the AVSMD revision 
is more likely to be at least somewhat effective in addressing that imbalance. 
Keywords: AVMSD; Copyright Directive, content funding, EU law  
Introduction 
As part of its flagship Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy launched in 2015, the Euro-
pean Commission promised to revise two directives that are crucial to Europe’s content 
producers: the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) and the Copyright Di-
rective. The DSM was a direct response to changes in multiple industries arising from the 
spread of the internet. It aims to facilitate growth in European digital services and net-
works and to enable consumers and businesses to benefit from the kind of cross-border 
access the internet can provide.1 The rapid spread of largely US-based global online plat-
forms has had severe consequences for Europe’s major content producers, the broadcast 
media and press publishers. Data from across Europe shows advertising revenues increas-
ing for online options and generally decreasing for the broadcasters and press publishers 
                                               
1European Commission, ‘Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions: A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COM (2015) 192 final. 
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that have traditionally relied on advertising to fund the production of content. Press cir-
culation figures have plummeted and audiences, particularly younger ones, are shifting 
away from linear broadcasting. The Commission recognised these issues and sought to 
address them in its proposals for changes to both the AVMSD and the Copyright Di-
rective, though using very different approaches that we examine in this article. A revised 
AVMSD was adopted on 2 October 2018 that brought video sharing platforms (VSPs) 
into its scope, extending to them some of the obligations and rules applicable to audio-
visual media services. The version of the Copyright Directive resulting from the 
Trialogue process would introduce a new right that press publishers can use to try to 
license their works in the online environment.2  
The European Union’s policy in relation to media has always been constrained, 
with its competences in this area changing little since the time of the European Economic 
Community. The EU can only play a supportive role in industrial and cultural policy3, so 
                                               
2The Trialogue is the process in which the versionsamended by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union are agreed with facilitation by the Commission.The talks 
resulted in a final agreement on 20 February 2019, which at the time of writing still had to 
be adopted officially in the Parliament. See Council of the European Union ‘Interinstitu-
tional File: 2016/0280(COD) of 20 February 2019 Proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market - Outcome 
of proceedings’ (available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-
2019-INIT/en/pdf), which would update Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society [2001] L 167/10 (hereafter: ‘Directive 
2001/29/EC’). 
3According to Article 6 of the Treaty for the European Union (TFEU), the Union can ‘support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States’ in relation to industry and cul-
ture, among other things. This is as opposed to other areas in which there is ‘shared com-
petence’ between the EU and the member states (Article 4), or the EU has ‘exclusive com-
petence’ (Article 3).  
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its policy making powers in relation to media content have been limited to the governance 
of competition. Nevertheless, since the 1989 Television without Frontiers Directive 
(TWFD), European policymakers have a long history of engaging in a kind of industrial 
policy via competition regulation in this area4 that has taken a fundamentally liberalising 
economic approach to media regulation,5 and partnered it with specific interventions in 
the market aimed at protecting Europe’s content industries.6 As we will demonstrate, the 
recent changes to the AVMSD draw heavily on this tradition. Copyright remains crucial 
to how audiovisual content producers monetise and finance content and they have always 
been vocal about ensuring adequate protections in EU law, but it has not played a signif-
icant role in the press industry, which has historically relied very little on trade in the 
licenses for content. Faced now with a failing press industry, EU policymakers seem to 
be trying to achieve the aims of a protectionist industrial policy by creating an additional 
property right in the Copyright Directive, an approach that we will argue is not likely to 
succeed.  
The literature on these two directives and their predecessors has been largely sep-
arate, understandably so, with one governing competition in audiovisual production and 
                                               
4Jackie Harrison and Lorna Woods, European broadcasting law and policy (CUP 2007). 
5Alison Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media markets (MUP 2006) pre-
sents a detailed account of how this approach came to be and was manifest. 
6The quotas for European works and independent production that were carried over into the 
AVMSD, have been described as protectionist industrial policies. See Jackie Harrison and 
Lorna Woods, ‘Television Quotas: protecting European Culture?’ (2001) 12 (1) 
Entertainment Law Review 5; Petros Iosifidis, Jeanette Steemers and Mark Wheeler, 
European Television Industries (British Film Institute 2005); Sally Broughton Micova, 
‘Content Quotas: What and Whom are the Protecting’ in Karen Donders, Caroline 




distribution markets and the other, mostly, about the enforcement of property rights. 
Scholarly debates about the TWFD and then AVMSD have focused on the consequences 
of the liberalisation on national markets, especially for smaller national markets,7 the ef-
fectiveness of its provisions,8 and in the lead up to the most recent revision, the extent to 
which the Directive was still adequate to the new converged market conditions.9 Litera-
ture about EU Copyright Law has engaged in debates about harmonization and scope of 
                                               
7For example, Jean-Claude Burgelman and Caroline Pauwels, ‘Audiovisual policy and cultural 
identity in small European states: the challenges of a unified market’ (1992) 14 (2) Media, 
Culture and Society 169; Harcourt (n 5). 
8One interesting critique of the AVMSD that did connect it to the Copyright issue was that its 
‘good intentions’ toward European content production were doomed to fail because of the 
Copyright Directive, see Fiona Macmillan, ‘Are You Sure/That We Are Awake?: Euro-
pean Media Policy and Copyright’ in Karen Donders, Caroline Pauwels and Jan Loisen 
(eds), The Palgrave Handbook of European Media Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 382. 
9Rachael Craufurd-Smith, ‘Determining Regulatory Competence for Audiovisual Media Ser-
vices in the European Union’ (2011) 3 (2) Journal of Media Law 263; Michael Wagner, 
‘Revisiting the Country-of-Origin Principle in the AVMS Directive’ (2014) 6 (2) Journal 
of Media Law 286; Indrek Ibrus and Ulrike Rohn, ‘Sharing killed the AVMSD star: the 
impossibility of European audiovisual media regulation in the era of the sharing economy’ 
(2016) 5 (2) Internet Policy Review 1. 
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exclusive rights,10 the exhaustive list of exceptions,11 and enforceability,12 most recently 
in relation to online services.13 In the lead-up to this current reform that would introduce 
a new Directive to update the law for the internet age, academic debates have raised issues 
of the efficiency of various options, implications for freedom of expression, and the ne-
cessity of additional rights.14 One of the most debated proposals is for the introduction of 
                                               
10See for example: Adolf Dietz, ‘The protection of intellectual property in the information age – 
the draft EU Copyright Directive of November 1997’ (1998) 4 IPQ 335; Thomas C. Vinje, 
‘Harmonising intellectual property laws in the European Union: past, present and future’ 
(1995) 17 (8) EIPR 361. 
11See for example: André Lucas, Pierre Sirinelli and Alexandra Bensamoun, Les exceptions au 
droit d'auteur: état des lieux et perspectives dans l'Union européenne (Dalloz 2012); 
Robert Burrell and Allison Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (CUP 
2005); Mireille Buydens and Séverine Dussollier, ‘Les exceptions au droit d’auteur: 
évolutions dangereuses’ [2001] CCE 10. 
12See for example: Charles-Henry Massa and Alain Strowel, ‘The scope of the proposed IP en-
forcement directive: torn between the desire to harmonise remedies and the need to com-
bat piracy’ (2004) 26 (6) EIPR 244; Stefan Kulk and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Fil-
tering for copyright enforcement in Europe after the Sabam cases’ (2012) 34 (11) EIPR 
791.  
13See for example: Paul Joseph, ‘copyright Reform: end of a dream?’ (2015) 10 (2) JIPLP 73; 
Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Eleonora Rosati, Karmen Turk, Christina Angelopoulos, Ale-
ksandra Kuczerawy, Miquel Peguera and Martin Husovec, ‘An academic perspective on 
the copyright reform’ (2017) 33 (1) C.L.S Rev. 3; Benjamin Farrand, ‘"Towards a modern, 
more European copyright framework", or, how to rebrand the same old approach?‘ (2019) 
41 (2) EIPR 65. 
14In favour: Thomas Höppner, ‘EU copyright reform: the case for a publisher’s right’ [2018] 
IPQ 1 Against: Martin Kretschmer et al., ‘The European Commission’s public consulta-
tion on the role of publishers in the copyright value chain: a response by the European 
Copyright Society’(2016) 38 (10) EIPR 591; Eleonora Rosati, ‘Neighbouring Rights for 
Publishers: are National and (Possible EU) Initiatives Lawful?’(2016) 47 (5) 569; Lionel 
Bently et al., ‘Response to Article 11 of the Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, entitled “Protection of press publications concerning digital uses” 
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a press publishers’ right, which is intended to tackle directly the loss of revenue experi-
enced by publishers.15 
In this round of revision undertaken as part of the DSM, both the AVMSD and 
the Copyright Directive are being used by policymakers to try to deal with the challenges 
for European content production perceived to be coming from the spread of online plat-
forms. In this paper, we contribute to debates about platform policy and regulation by 
uniquely examining the two Directives together and analysing the changes as efforts to 
protect the ability of content producers to monetise content, using the comparison to as-
                                               
on behalf of thirty seven professors and leading scholars of Intellectual Property, Infor-
mation Law and Digital Economy’(Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law, 
2016) <https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/sites/www.law.cam.ac.uk/files/im-
ages/www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/documents/ipomodernisingipprofresponsepresspublish-
ers.pdf>; Mireille van Eechoud, ‘A publisher’s intellectual property right: implications for 
freedom of expression, author and open content policies’(Openfoum Europe, 2017) pp 18-
24 <http://www.openforumeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/OFE-Academic-Pa-
per-Implications-of-publishers-right_FINAL.pdf>; Giancarlo Frosio, Christophe Geiger 
and Oleksandr Bulayenko, ‘The introduction of a neighbouring right for press publisher at 
EU level: the unneeded (and unwanted) reform’(2017) 39(4) EIPR 208; Taina Pihlajarinne 
and Juha Vesala, ‘Proposed right of press publishers: a workable solution?’(2018) 13 (3) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 220. 
15 See CREATe, ‘Copyright Reform: Open Letter from European Research Centres’ (2017) 
<https://www.create.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/OpenLetter_EU_Copyright_Re-
form_24_02_2017.pdf>; JRC, ‘Online News Aggregation and Neighbouring Rights for 
News Publishers’ (2017) <https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/4776/response/15356/at-
tach/6/Doc1.pdf>; European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, ‘Strengthening the Position of Press Publishers and Authors and 





sess the potential for success in those efforts. Firstly, we describe the challenges to Euro-
pean broadcasters and press publishers arising from the recent developments in the mar-
ket that have been identified as meriting the policy interventions reflected in the revisions 
to the Directives. Secondly, we offer an account of how until now the EU has worked 
within its policy making constraints to try to protect European content producers from 
perceived threats, mainly from US corporations. We show how these efforts have 
amounted to harmonization of rules and interventions affecting the capacity and incen-
tives for investment in content production. We then examine the relevant changes to the 
AVMSD and to the proposals for a press publishers right in the Copyright Directive, 
elaborating the different approaches. We argue that the levelling of the playing field ap-
proach taken in the AVMSD revision is more likely to at least slightly address the chal-
lenges facing European content producers than the approach in the planned Copyright 
Directive, which is more likely to add further to the imbalance of power between press 
publishers and online platforms. 
The impact of online platforms on ‘traditional’ content producers 
The spread of online platforms has caused a number of issues for ‘traditional media,’16 
most of which they claim make it more challenging for them to generate revenues and 
thus, fund new original content.17 Competition is intensifying following an explosion of 
                                               
16By this term, we mean press publishers (newspapers and magazines), linear audiovisual media 
services (television), and radio.  
17See various responses to the European Commission’s consultation on the regulatory environ-
ment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative 
environment well as the European Commission’s consultation of the role of publishers in 
the copyright value chain and on the “panorama exception”, for example: European Pub-
lishers Council (EPC), ‘Public Consultation on the role of publishers in the Copyright 
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digital content and platforms, on-going globalisation and market fragmentation, and con-
stantly changing media consumer preferences and habits.18 This led some scholars to ar-
gue that the internet has the power to ‘cannibalise’ traditional offline media.19 Press pub-
lishers across the EU have experienced threats to their financial sustainability due to a 
decline in their income from advertising and circulation. Advertising-dependent broad-
cast television services have had to rethink their main revenue drivers to deal with the 
increased competition for viewer time and advertiser spending. Advertising-dependent 
online platforms compete with broadcasters and press publishers for advertising, and of-
ten serve as important intermediaries between these traditional content producers and 
much of their audience due to their function as aggregators or sharing services.  
Linear audiovisual media services (television) 
The audiovisual landscape is changing at a rapid pace, with long-lasting consequences on 
the traditional media ecosystem, a large part of which is dependent on advertising income 
                                               
value chain and on the ‘panorama exception’ (European Commission Report and Studies, 
2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-38/or-
ganisations_registered_in_the_transparency_register_A05B8047-BE72-2BA6-
838F586F7C0D4A85_47162.zip>; The European association of television and radio sales 
houses (egta), ‘Answer to the public consultation on online platforms, cloud & data, liabil-
ity of intermediaries, collaborative economy’ (European Commission Report and Studies, 
2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-
7/egta_13918.pdf>. 
18Tom Evens, ‘Media economics and transformation in a digital Europe’ in Leen d’Haenens et. 
al (eds), Comparative Media Policy, Regulation and Governance in Europe. Unpacking 
the Policy Cycle (Intellect 2018) 41. 
19For an overview of those scholars, see: Jiyoung Cha and Sylvia M. Chan-Olmsted, ‘Substituta-
bility between Online Video Platforms and Television’ (2012) 89 (2) Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly 261. 
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to finance the production of content.20 Viewing habits have changed significantly, with 
younger audiences in particular watching more online than offline content in some mar-
kets, and more often watching content on portable devices. Viewing time is a crucial 
metric in the audiovisual sector, as the number of people consuming a media service is of 
particular significance for its income.21 It is taken into consideration by the advertisers 
when deciding how to place their commercial communication around any given pro-
gramme and determines what they are willing to pay for it.22 With the spread of connected 
TVs, addressable and interactive advertising for television is developing in most Euro-
pean markets, yet it still remains very difficult to track a consumer’s reaction to most 
broadcast advertising.23 As a result, advertisers pay on the basis of consumers’ anticipated 
exposure to the ad rather than their actions as a result of seeing the ads.24 Therefore, a 
                                               
20European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Commercial communications in the AVMSD revision’ 
(Council of Europe, 2017), p 5 <https://rm.coe.int/168078348c>. 
21However, audience falls do not always translate into declines in revenue, as audience is only 
one of three key variables (reach, volume, price) feeding into advertising revenue. 
22Mario La Torre, The Economics of the Audiovisual Industry: Financing TV, Film and Web 
(Palgrave 2014) 46. 
23In the literature, this has been put forward as one of the main weaknesses of television adver-
tising. See for example: Chris Hackley, Advertising and Promotion (SAGE 2017) 192, 
193. See also Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti, ‘Targeting in advertising markets: 
implications for offline versus online media’ (2011) 42 (3) Journal of Economics 417, 418 
and Wenjuan Ma et al., ‘Online Advertising’ in Robin Mansell et al. (eds), The Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Digital Communication and Society (John Wiley & Sons 2015) 3. 
Nevertheless, there is qualitative research available that gives evidence to the effects of 
television advertising more broadly. See for example: Thinkbox, ‘Profit Ability: the busi-
ness case for advertising research charts’ (November 2017) <https://www.thinkbox.tv/Re-
search/Nickable-Charts/Thinkbox-research-charts/Profit-Ability-the-business-case-for-ad-
vertising?download=1>. 
24James Ratliff and Daniel Rubinfeld, ‘Online Advertising: Defining Relevant Markets’ (2010) 





decreased audience has a negative impact on advertising revenues for the traditional 
broadcast media.  
Across Europe, linear TV content still accounts for a major share of average daily 
viewing time when looking at the whole population,25 but this is declining and new types 
of content, and new players, including video on demand (VOD) and VSPs, are now well-
established.26 There has been a drastic change of dynamics for younger audiences, with 
online video consumption increasing and linear TV consumption dropping27. As users 
watch more video content online, advertisers are allocating higher proportions of their 
                                               
25In 2017, Broadcast TV made up 71% of people’s total TV and audiovisual daily viewing; the 
remaining 29% was non-broadcast content such as YouTube and subscription on-demand 
services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime Video. 
26In the UK television viewing is declining significantly. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU 
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audio-
visual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities’ (Eur-Lex, 25 May 
2016), Recital 1 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0287&from=EN> (hereafter ‘AVMSD Pro-
posal’). In France and Germany slightly less drastically, where it dropped by 4 minutes a 
day between 2011 and 2016. European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Yearbook 2017/2018 – 
Key Trends’, p 44 (Council of Europe, 2018) <https://rm.coe.int/yearbook-keytrends-
2017-2018-en/16807b567e> and Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medi-
enbereich, ‘Fernsehnutzung’ (KEK, 2018) <https://www.kek-online.de/medienkonzentra-
tion/mediennutzung/fernsehnutzung/>.  
27For UK data see Ofcom, ‘Media Nations: UK’, p 4, 20 (18 July 2018) 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/116006/media-nations-2018-
uk.pdf> and for the German example see Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration 




budgets to such channels.28 In Europe, online video advertising income is expected to 
have grown by 720% between 2010 and the end of 2018,29 with a market share of almost 
60% in the EU-5 for Facebook and YouTube.30 In contrast, the size of the EU television 
advertising market decreased by 8% between 2008 –before the economic downturn– and 
2016,31 despite the stabilisation of the market to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 
of 2.2% between 2011 and 2016.32 The internet has overtaken TV as the top advertising 
medium, as online advertising in total grew with a CAGR of 17.8%.33 The ability to target 
very specifically, availability of measurement data, and technological tools to ease buying 
online ad inventory seem to make it an attractive option for those deciding where to spend 
their advertising budgets.  
Finally, some online platforms also compete with traditional content producers 
for on-screen talent, programme producers, writers and other production inputs,34 but 
with much larger budgets at their disposal. VOD services are now provided by traditional 
                                               
28David Abecassis et al., ‘Convergence of TV and Digital Platforms: Increased Innovation and 
Competition for Advertisers Budgets’ (SSRN, 2017), p 9 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3092181>. 
29Christian Grece, ‘The online advertising market in the EU – Update 2015 and focus on pro-
grammatic advertising’ (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2016) p 40 <https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=43866>. 
30ibid, p 4. 
31European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Yearbook 2017/2018 – Key Trends’ (n 26) 48. 
32Christian Grece, ‘The online advertising market in the EU – Update 2017’ (European Audio-
visual Observatory, 2016), p 7 <https://rm.coe.int/the-eu-online-advertising-market-up-
date-2017/168078f2b3>. 
33ibid. 





television channels and telecom operators, directly from some film producers and distrib-
utors, by content aggregators, video sharing platforms and even from audiovisual archives 
and public support funds;35 however, it is subscription-based services such as Netflix that 
are experiencing rapid expansion.36 The key reason for this rise in subscriptions was the 
access to original and exclusive content.37 While global players like Netflix and Amazon 
are driving up the costs of production with their large budget projects, traditional audio-
visual content producers have seen reduced budgets, particularly public service media.38 
Still, investment of VOD providers in original programmes for the production and pro-
motion of EU works remains minimal compared to the main TV groups on an EU level.39 
Public service broadcaster (PSBs), many of which have mixed funding systems that in-
clude advertising, originated 73% of TV fiction and 44% of TV fiction hours produced 
each year in Europe, but the future of this investment is uncertain as, except in Germany, 
                                               
35See Christian Grece et al., ‘The development of the European Market for on-demand audiovis-
ual services’ (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/news-
room/dae/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=9273>. 
36ibid, 4. 
37Ofcom ‘Media Nations UK’ (n 27) 15. 
38According to Ofcom, ‘Communications Market Report 2018’ (Ofcom, 2018), p 34 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/117256/CMR-2018-narrative-re-
port.pdf> spending by BBC ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 on new UK-made TV pro-
grammes fell to a 20-year low in 2017. And there were there were significant drops in in-
vestment in original programmes by broadcasters in Italy (-16%), Spain (-25%), Ireland (-
17%) and Portugal (-26%) during the period 2009-2013, see Deirdre Kevin, ‘Investments 
in original content by audiovisual services’, p 11 (European Audiovisual Observatory, 
2015) <https://rm.coe.int/16807835ca>. 
39In 2013, the main TV groups in 15 countries invested EUR 15.6 billion (i.e. 24% of their total 
revenues) in these original works. In contrast, VOD providers invested EUR 10 million 
(i.e. less than 1% of their total revenues. For further information see: Kevin (n 38). 
14 
 
PSB revenues have been hard hit across Europe.40 Investment in original content produc-
tion by some larger online VOD services does not seem to be compensating for the re-
duced capacity of those that have been the engines of European content production. 
Press publishers 
Since the beginning of the spread of online platforms, press publishers have been experi-
encing significant declines in revenues and circulation. Research shows that fewer and 
fewer people read print newspapers, and young people who once could be expected to 
become newspaper readers as they matured, long ago stopped making that transition.41 
This has led to a significant change in the funding for newspaper content, which tradi-
tionally heavily relied on advertising revenues alongside paid subscriptions. Advertising 
budgets have migrated away from newspapers and magazines to online display, search, 
and classified formats, due to falling print circulation levels and the relatively high costs 
of placing print advertisements.42 Platforms offer cheaper, often free, alternatives to the 
classified ads, which used to be a source of reliable revenues for newspaper publishers, 
and provide cheaper and more targeted alternatives to display advertising in print. At the 
same time, platforms compete directly with print media, including their online versions 
for audience attention. News aggregators, search platforms and social media often also 
serve as an intermediary between press publishers and their audiences as content pro-
duced by the publishers is accessed via the platforms. While this sometimes helps the 
content reach much wider audiences than it would have otherwise, publishers cannot 
                                               
40European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Yearbook 2017/2018 – Key Trends’ (n 26) 64. 
41Elizabeth Bird, ‘The future of journalism in the digital environment’ (2009) 10 (3) Journalism 
293. 
42Ofcom, ‘Communications Market Report’ (n 38) 45. 
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monetise that additional reach unless audiences click to their own ad-supported website.  
In the EU, the market share of newspapers as an advertising medium was 14.3% 
in 2016, down from 23% in 2011 and 6.6% in magazines, down from 11% in 2011 with 
varying but clear downturns in every national market across Europe.43 Press publisher’s 
efforts to open up new digital revenue streams (e-editions, paywalls, reader contributions, 
programmatic advertising, and digital marketing services), have not come close to re-
couping the revenues lost from changes to traditional print consumption.44 Even when 
users engage with news brands online, the yields for publishers are much lower than in 
analogue print.45 Increasingly, users are primarily accessing news on platforms like Fa-
cebook,46 which, along with a plethora of advertising-supported websites not connected 
to press publishers, compete with the traditional producers of news content for advertising 
                                               
43European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Yearbook 2017/2018 – Key Trends’ (n 26) 48. For spe-
cific data from France seeConseil Superieur De L’Audiovisuel, ‘Media et Publicite en 
ligne’ (European Platform of Regulatory Authorities, July 2018), p 3 
<https://www.csa.fr/content/download/252403/690290/version/7/file/CSA_Etude%20Mé-
dias%20et%20Publicités.pdf> and for the UK see Mediatique, ‘Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media & Sport – Overview of recent dynamics in the UK press market’ (DCMS, 




45Mediatique (n 43) 37. At the aggregate level, one print reader is worth approximately eight 
digital users, see Deloitte, ‘UK News Media: an engine of original news content and de-
mocracy’ (News Media UK, 2016) <http://www.newsmediauk.org/write/Me-
diaUploads/In%20the%20Spotlight/NMA%20Economic%20Report/Final_Re-
port_News_Media_Economic_Impact_Study.pdf> 
46European Audiovisual Observatory, ‘Commercial communications in the AVMSD revision’ 
(n 20) 5. 
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spend. It has been argued therefore that the fact that the many online platforms are adver-
tising funded media but do not produce content themselves poses a serious threat to ad-
funded journalistic media.47 
Much of the news that is being accessed on online platforms is created by press 
publishers and other traditional news media, with online platforms serving as intermedi-
aries by aggregating and producing excerpts or allowing people to share links, often with 
images and headlines or excerpts. These platforms often satisfy readers’ need for infor-
mation without readers getting to the webpage of the publisher,48 without, therefore, the 
publisher being able to monetise the attention of those readers. A Reuters Institute exper-
iment tracking more than 2,000 respondents in the UK, found that while most readers 
could remember the path through which they found a news story (Facebook, Google, 
etc.), less than half could recall the name of the news brand that had created that content 
when accessing it from search (37%) and social media (47%),49 and in several countries 
well over half used the platform for news.50 Significant numbers of people are therefore 
using platforms like Facebook to access news and may not even know the source that 
created the news or contribute to the monetisation of that content for the publisher.  
                                               
47For an overview of these issues including examples see: Gabriele Siegert, ‘From “the end of 
advertising as we know it” to “beyond content”? Changes in advertising and the impact on 
journalistic media’ in Heinz-Werner Nienstedt et al. (eds), Journalism and media conver-
gence (de Gruyter 2013) 34. 
48For further information on the sources of news consumption, see for example: Ofcom, ’News 
consumption in the UK: 2018’ (2018) <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/as-
sets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf>. 
49Nic Newman and others, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017 (Reuters Institute for the 
Study of Journalism 2017) 10.  
50ibid. Romania 69% and Greece 62%. The UK and Germany had the lowest figures for the use 




The prediction of the early 2000s that “television is dead” has not yet happened, but the 
Commission rightly identified significant challenges to Europe’s broadcasters, and an ur-
gency to these challenges. The evidence shows that attention is moving away from tradi-
tional producers of content, their revenues are being affected by competition for adver-
tising spend from online platforms offering audiovisual content. The first challenge 
comes from subscription VOD services such as Netflix that are gaining ever-larger shares 
of audience attention and driving up prices for content production, but not yet investing 
equivalently in original European content. The second major challenge comes from ad-
vertising dependent sharing platforms such as YouTube, which competes for both viewer 
attention and advertising budgets. Press publishers have suffered the most from the spread 
of online platforms. Their offline readerships have declined drastically, while the reve-
nues they are generating from their own online activities are far from compensating for 
that loss. They face competition for advertising budgets and the also face the intermediary 
challenge, which is essentially that their ability to monetise their content is being affected 
by the fact that it is increasingly being consumed and shared via online platforms. Argu-
ments that what is at stake is the maintenance of European culture and the future provision 
of the news content crucial to Europe’s democratic processes have found sympathy 
among many EU level policymakers.  
EU’s history of protectionism 
It is not new for European policymakers to be sympathetic to the plight of content pro-
ducers. The EU’s liberalising economic approach has been tempered by a heavy dose of 
protectionism against perceived threats to European content production, rooted in as-
sumptions about the benefits of both a common, competitive market and of protectionist 
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measures that have long featured in the national policy of many member states.  
Liberalising for European Giants 
Broadcasting was defined as an economic activity, as opposed to a public good, by the 
landmark 1974 case Sacchi v Italy, 51 when a cable operator sued against the monopoly 
of the Italian public service broadcaster.52 The determination that broadcasting would be 
regulated by competition rules, and not treated as a cultural institution, paved the way for 
liberalisation in television broadcasting. The Television without Frontiers Directive 
(TWFD) that was adopted in 1989 required the removal of barriers to cross border trans-
mission of television services.53 Many PSBs found their positions weakened by the in-
creased competition; however, this liberalisation was intended to boost rather than under-
mine European content production.  
In the policy processes that led up to the TWFD, the rapid spread of American 
content was perceived to be a threat to the European content production sector, and there-
fore to European culture, and one of the aims of the Directive was to help European pro-
ducers and European content be more competitive.54 At that time, most broadcast content 
                                               
51Case C-155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409.  
52For full discussion of implications of this case see Eric Barendt and Leslie Hitchens, Media 
Law: Cases and Materials (Pearsons Education Limited 2001) 168. 
53For example, even though Austria did not end its PSB monopoly in television until the adop-
tion of a law on commercial television in 2001, foreign channels, particularly ones from 
Germany already had captured significant audiences, see Thomas Steinmaurer, ‘Diversity 
through delay?: the Austrian case’ (2009) 71 (1-2) International Communication Gazette 
77. 
54See discussion in Harrison and Woods (n 4); Andrea Esser, ‘Trends in Programming: Com-
mericalization, Transnationalization, Convergence’ in Alec Charles (ed), Media in the en-
larged Europe: politics, policy and industry (Intellect 2009) 23; Jeremy Tunstall and Da-
vid Machin, The Anglo-American Media Connection (OUP 1999). 
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was produced or commissioned by PSBs, and even many of them were showing large 
amounts of content produced in the US.55 The TWFD was intended to give European 
television providers access to larger audiences in hopes it would give them a benefit of 
scale somewhat comparable to services in the US. This primarily applied to commercial 
services, but also to PSBs with dual funding that relied partially on advertising. It was 
also intended to enable cross-border investment in commercial television services and 
pan-European distribution of content. 
Pan-European quotas and common advertising standards 
The TWFD’s market maximising approach was coupled with the very protectionist meas-
ure of imposing quotas for European works and independent production aimed at ensur-
ing a market for the production industries.56 Since the 1989 Directive, television stations 
in Europe have had to ensure that at least 50% of their broadcast time was made up of 
European works, and 10% had to be dedicated to independent production.57 As they often 
run parallel to similar national measures aimed at protecting national industries and cul-
ture, European works quotas are generally met by domestic content with limited or no 
market outside its country of origin.58 With the 2007 AVMSD, VOD services were en-
couraged to promote European works in their catalogues, and member states were 
                                               
55David Hutchinson, ‘The European Community and Audio-visual Culture’ [1993] Canadian 
Journal of Communications 437. 
56Harrison and Woods (n 6); for more on quotas as economic or commercial protectionism see 
also: Harrison and Woods (n 4) and Lesley Hitchens, Broadcasting Pluralism and Diver-
sity (Hart Publishing 2006). 
57This 10% could be out of production budgets rather than broadcast time.  
58Where the European quota is higher than domestic ones, they may further help ensure national 
language(s) are on air and they may contribute to culturally relevant production in states in 
which regulators have further defined qualifying content. Broughton Micova (n 6). 
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charged with monitoring. The Directive sets out common conditions on the nature of ad-
vertising, prohibiting medicinal products and subliminal messaging and requiring respect 
for human dignity and the protection of minors.59 This feature of the AVMSD can be seen 
as an attempt to level the playing field among services. 
The Use of State aid 
The use of state aid within the common market is allowed for the development of certain 
economic activities and areas as it ‘does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest’.60 State aid to public service broadcasting is spe-
cifically allowed under the Amsterdam Protocol, as long as it has been conferred a public 
service remit by the member state, and does not affect trading conditions and competition 
to an extent beyond the common interest.61 With two Communications, 2001 and 2009,62 
and decisions on individual cases, the Commission has gradually constrained the use of 
state aid for PSB and moved towards requiring an ex ante test for public value and market 
impact for new services and ever more specific definitions of remit and services.63 At the 
                                               
59Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit 
of television broadcasting activities [2007] L332/27, art 9 (hereafter: ‘AVMSD 2007’).  
60TFEU Article 107(3)(c), formerly of Article 87 of the European Community Treaty. 
61Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C 340. 
62European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid 
rules to public service broadcasting’ [2001] OJ C 320/04); European Commission, ‘Com-
munication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service 
broadcasting’ [2009] OJ C 257/01. 
63For example, see European Commission, ‘Decision of 28 October 2009 concerning state fund-
ing for Austrian public broadcaster’ [2009] E2/2008, which was decided shortly after the 
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same time, the case record indicates that the Commission rarely raises objections to tax 
breaks or direct funding for content production outside of the PSB systems. Subsidies for 
the production of TV and radio programmes for broadcast on commercial services rather 
than PSB have been regularly supported, for example in France64 and Denmark65 several 
times, and also recently in Croatia.66 
State subsidies to support press publishers are also very common in Europe and 
often also constitute state aid. With a few exceptions, the Commission has been very 
accepting of national funds to support press publishers in the production of content, and 
                                               
2009 Communication place extensive requirements on Austria to further define and limit 
the remit of its ORF, with specific conditions on its activities related to sports coverage 
and online services and required a revision of supervision and additional rules on market 
behaviour. In a later example, it required Belgian authorities to amend the regulatory 
framework for RTBF to install a clear distinction between its PSB and commercial activi-
ties and ex ante tests for new services. A more extensive discussion of Commission deci-
sion before and after the 2009 Communication can be found in Karan Donders, ‘State Aid 
to Public Service Media’ (2015) 14 (1) European State Aid Law Quarterly 68. 
64European Commission, ‘Aides financières automatiques à la production et à la préparation des 
oeuvres cinématographiques de longue durée’ [2017] SA.48699, which continued support 
in cases European Commission, ‘Extension of French film support schemes’ [2011] 
SA.33370 (for the audiovisual support scheme for period 2014-2017); European 
Commission, ‘Aides financières automatiques à la production et à la préparation des 
œuvres audiovisuelles - documentaire de création et fiction’ [2017] SA.48907 (for 
documentaries); European Commission, ‘Régimes d'aide au cinéma et à l'audiovisuel’ 
[2006] NN84/2004. 
65European Commission, ‘Scheme for the production and broadcasting of Danish TV drama and 
TV documentary programmes (prolongation of State aid N360/2007, N599/2009 and 
SA.32479)’ [2013] SA.36761, which repeated the support given also in cases N360/2007, 
N599/2009, SA.32479 (2011) for the Danish ‘Public Service Pool’ for the production of 
TV drama and documentaries for broadcast by non-PSB services. 
66European Commission, ‘Decision on subsidizing the production and broadcasting of audiovis-
ual and/or radio programmes for radio and TV broadcasters’ [2013] SA.35513. 
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not just for printed press. For example, the Danish press support scheme was allowed to 
provide state aid of approximately €52million between 2014 and 2019 to press publishers 
to produce content that could be distributed on the platform of their choice.67 Support for 
local minority language print and online publishers is sometimes not even considered to 
constitute state aid because they have such a local impact.68 In cases where there could 
be implications for publishers from a neighbouring ‘kin state’ to a national minority the 
Commission still did not raise objections.69 It has also raised no objections to grants di-
rectly to publishers in order to help them overhaul their online offering,70 which could be 
considered in competition with online services from anywhere. The Commission has con-
sistently allowed state aid in the form of sustained financial support to press publishers 
and ad hoc assistance to help struggling publishers modernize and meet the challenges of 
the current media market. 
Protecting against the threats from across the Atlantic 
Since the late 1980s, European media policymakers have tread carefully within an overall 
                                               
67European Commission, ‘Production and innovation aid to written media’ [2013] SA.36366. 
68For example, in cases European Commission, ‘Aid to support the Valencian language in the 
press [2016] SA. 45512 and European Commission, ‘Promotion of the Basque language in 
digital news media’ [2017] SA. 47448 dealing with Valencian and Basque language pub-
lishers in Spain the commission determined the assistance did not constitute aid. 
69For example, in cases European Commission, ‘Individual state aid to Madach-Posonium, Lil-
ium Aurum, Petit Press’ [2013] SA.35814, SA.35815 and SA.35816, the Commission al-
lowed the Slovak government to provide direct support to private publishers to produce 
newspapers, magazines and online content in Hungarian language. 
70The Greek government was allowed to make temporary grants to 3 private publishers specifi-
cally to improve their offerings online with the aim of sustainability. European Commis-
sion Decision, ‘Restructuring aid to Makedoniki and Ekdotiki’ [2012] SA.33741 and Eu-
ropean Commission Decision, ‘Restructuring aid to Kalofolias’ [2010] N672/2008. 
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liberal market paradigm to attempt to protect European content production, particularly 
commercial producers of content, in the face of threats from across the Atlantic. The 
TWFD was drafted against the backdrop of the spread of American made television pro-
grammes and films. It was intended to enable commercial broadcasting to grow within a 
wider European market with common standards making a level playing field, and to en-
courage investment in European content through quotas. When the AVMSD replaced it, 
changes were made to account for technological change, but the overall approach re-
mained the same. State aid has been widely allowed to support content production in both 
broadcasting and press publishing, including national level schemes to help press pub-
lishers adapt and even bailouts to specific press publishers. These tactics used so far have 
all been ones that attempt to shape the conditions of competition, whether it was by af-
fecting the rules by which competing services must play, in the direction of equalising 
them, or by weighing in on one side with quotas or state aid to affect investment in Euro-
pean content. 
The latest attempts to save European content production 
The 2015 DSM Strategy initiated revisions to the AVMSD and the Copyright Directive, 
as well as a review of the role of online platforms, as part of its overall aim to create 
enabling conditions for European digital networks and services. Once again, European 
policymakers had identified a threat to European content producers, this time in the form 
of online platforms, largely global companies based in the US. In this section, we elabo-
rate how elements of the revision to the AVMSD and the introduction of a press pub-
lisher’s right in the Copyright Directive are attempts to redress the imbalances between 
the online platforms and Europe’s audiovisual media and press publishers. We identify 
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the differences in the approaches and likely consequences for the policies’ potential ef-
fectiveness. 
An AVMSD for a digital age 
The 2018 revision to the AVMSD introduced a number of changes, including clarity on 
jurisdiction and conditions for derogation from the country of origin principle and the 
establishment of the European Regulators Group (ERGA), along with criteria for inde-
pendent regulators. Here we focus on those provisions of the revised Directive that relate 
to the funding of content. The first set of provisions are aimed at ensuring investment in 
European works, whereas the other set establishes common standards, mainly in con-
sumer protection. Essentially the first addresses the Netflix challenge71 and the other the 
YouTube challenge, both which we described above. The provisions are aimed at incen-
tivising investment in European content production and levelling the playing field on 
which these newer services compete with European audiovisual media services for ad-
vertising.72  
The Commission already in 2013 pointed out that without the territorial re-
strictions, online audiovisual media services should be able to address all the EU’s inter-
net users, but that it was US services that were successfully reaching this fragmented 
                                               
71For an elaboration of the Netflix challenge with the example of the case of its servicing the 
French market from Luxembourg, see Wagner (n 9). 
72The provisions related to advertising are also intended to extend protections for audiences, es-
pecially minors, but this is outside the scope of this paper. The levelling of the playing 
field for competing services was expressed clearly in the preparatory documents, the pre-
amble and in the statements of policymakers. 
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market.73 In May 2015 it issued a proposal for revising the AVMSD that referred to calls 
from broadcasters for a more level playing field and to content producers for stronger 
obligations on European works. The Commission proposed a 20% European works re-
quirement for VOD catalogues as part of its “levelling up” of the rules across all ser-
vices.74 It also proposed that member states be allowed to impose financial contributions 
to the production of European works not just on VOD services in their jurisdiction, but 
also on those targeting their citizens, giving a green light to laws underway in France and 
Germany imposing such levies.  
The final version adopted by the European Parliament in October 2018 raises the 
requirement for European works in VOD catalogues to 30%.75 It also changed the Com-
mission’s original wording on the imposition of financial contributions to apply to “media 
service providers” more generally and not just VOD providers.76 This is not a small 
                                               
73European Commission, ‘Green Paper: Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: 
Growth, Creation and Values’ COM (2013) 231 final, p 5. 
74In the explanatory note accompanying the proposal the Commission stated it would amount to 
a levelling up of the rules on VOD and VSP services to accompany a relaxation of rules 
for linear audiovisual media services. See AVMSD Proposal (n 26) 10.  
75Gilles Fontaine and Christian Grece, ‘Origin of films and TV content in VOD catalogues in 
the EU & Visibility of films on VOD services’ (EAO, 2016) 
<https://rm.coe.int/1680783582>, found Netflix to be the only pan-European subscription 
VOD provider with 19% of its film catalogue made up of European films and 32% of its 
TV programme catalogue made up of European works, though there was variation on 
these figures across the 28 countries in which it did business. 
76European Parliament, ‘European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 October 2018 on the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
ministrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media ser-
vices in view of changing market realities (COM(2016)0287 – C8-0193/2016 –
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change. It may ostensibly seem fairer, as it would apply to linear and on-demand services, 
however providers of linear audiovisual media services are still overwhelmingly the big-
gest investors in the production of European content.77 If member states put additional 
levies on such services it could create further imbalance, as some broadcasters may have 
to contribute some of their already tight budgets to film funds or similar schemes that 
may not translate back into filling transmission time on their own services against which 
advertising can be sold. It also gives room for governments to abuse the imposition of 
such levies for political purposes. Though it largely reflects the existing situation, the 
quota on catalogues may contribute in a small way towards encouraging Netflix, Amazon 
Prime and others to invest in buying or producing European content. However, as now 
worded, there is a danger that the provisions for allowing states to impose levies could 
negatively affect investment by broadcasters.  
To address the YouTube challenge, the Commission proposed an extension of the 
scope of the AVMSD to VSPs, a new category that is now defined as services that are for 
the dissemination of programmes or user-generated content over which they do not have 
editorial responsibility, but do have responsibility stemming from their organisation of 
that content.78 Recital 3a, which was added in the final adopted version, explains, “these 
                                               
2016/0151(COD))’ (2018) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-0364+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. 
77Aside from news content, public and private broadcasters invest overwhelmingly more in fic-
tion that VOD services. Gilles Fontaine, ‘TV fiction production in the European Union’ 
(EAO, 2017) <https://rm.coe.int/tv-fiction-production-in-the-eu-2017/16807bb1c2>. 
78The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, ‘Position of the European 
Parliament adopted at first reading on 2 October 2018 with a view to the adoption of Di-
rective (EU) 2018/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
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social media services need to be included because they compete for the same audiences 
and revenues as the audiovisual media services.”79 This addition directly acknowledges 
the commercial threat to European audiovisual media services posed by the spread of 
YouTube and other VSPs. The Commission’s draft would have required VSPs to protect 
minors from harmful content and protect all consumers from incitement and illegal con-
tent in a similar manner to other audiovisual media services and its proposal relaxed 
slightly the quantitative advertising limits for linear services and switched product place-
ment rules for audiovisual media services from a “banned except in”… rule to an “al-
lowed except in” one.80  
The final version of the AVMSD revision goes further towards evening out the 
rules by applying the rules for commercial communications also to VSPs. Article 9, which 
itself has been expanded in the revision, sets out common standards for commercial com-
munication. Audiovisual media service providers have been following these rules since 
the first Directive in 1989, and since the 2007 revision that resulted in the AVMSD they 
have also participated in codes of conduct related to the advertising of unhealthy food and 
beverages around children’s programming. The novelty in Article 9 is that member states 
are now required to encourage the use of co-regulation and fostering of self-regulation 
both for the advertising of alcohol and the codes of conduct on advertising of unhealthy 
                                               
ministrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media ser-
vices (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities’ (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2 October 2018), art 1 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get-
Doc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-0364+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (hereaf-
ter: ‘AVMSD 2018 adopted text’). 
79ibid. 
80AVMSD Proposal (n 26). 
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food and beverage that “shall aim to effectively reduce the exposure of children to audi-
ovisual commercial communications for such foods and beverages.”81 The stronger lan-
guage referring to co- and self-regulation in Article 9 is backed up by another novelty, 
the addition of an Article 4a, which establishes criteria for such mechanisms including 
that they: “provide for regular, transparent and independent monitoring and evaluation of 
the achievement of the objectives aimed at; and provide for effective enforcement includ-
ing effective and proportionate sanctions.”82  
In most of Europe, co-regulatory mechanisms involve advertisers and agencies, 
and ads are pre-cleared before they appear on television or in print. Advertisements from 
major advertisers that appear on VSPs will have already passed through this process. 
Large VSPs, such as YouTube, already have terms and conditions that reflect some of the 
rules contained in Article 9. However, not all of them are covered, and reducing exposure 
of children to commercial communication pitching unhealthy food and beverage is a 
somewhat vague goal that will be difficult to achieve across the volume of content on 
VSPs. A large portion of online advertising is done by smaller businesses and online-only 
businesses that do not engage in other forms of advertising. The extent to which these 
rules will now capture advertising that is not already covered by existing mechanisms 
will have to be seen and will likely vary by jurisdiction. It is important to note that the 
revised Directive does make VSPs responsible both for the advertising inventory they sell 
directly, often through programmatic means, and for the advertising their users are selling 
on their ‘channels’ through partnership agreements with the VSPs.83 To some extent they 
may be able to come in line with the Directive by adjusting the terms and conditions to 
                                               
81AVMSD 2018 adopted text (n 78) art 9(4). 
82ibid, art. 4a(1). 
83ibid, art 28b. 
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which those posting content and selling advertising must comply, but much will depend 
on the shape and conditions of the national co- and self-regulatory mechanisms. The fact 
that Article 9 now applies to VSPs as well as audiovisual media services does make the 
rules fairer in terms of what kind of advertising is allowed and is likely make things 
somewhat more level in terms of the regulatory burden.  
A new rule in the final version of the AVMSD stems from the General Data Pro-
tection Rules (GDPR) that went into effect in May 2018, and applies equally to all audi-
ovisual media services and to VSPs. It implements the pronouncement in recital 38 of the 
GDPR that the personal data of minors deserves special protection particularly in its use 
“for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles.”84 In the recitals 
of the revised AVMSD, policymakers recognised that the various mechanisms to protect 
minors, such as age verification and parental controls, will also gather data about them. 
The AVMSD will now ban audiovisual media service providers (article 6a) and VSPs 
(article 28b (3)) from using the data gathered for marketing, profiling or targeted adver-
tising. There will be variety in the measures used to protect minors and nature and extent 
of data gathered across the different services. Even in places where addressable television 
advertising is being offered, data is mainly about households rather than individual mi-
nors, so drawing the line as to what constitutes a minor’s personal data will present a 
challenge. VSPs gather a lot of data about individual users who may be minors, but not 
all of it might be directly connected to the measures aimed at protecting them, so to what 
extent will that data be allowed? The details of how this will be implemented will need 
                                               
84Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1, recital 38. 
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to be carefully worked out in guidance from the Commission and regulators, and probably 
through future case law. Nevertheless, the rule is the same for both audiovisual media 
services and VSPs, and is likely to affect VSPs more as their advertising is much depend-
ent on the use of data about individuals.  
Rules for commercial communication are still not entirely the same, as linear ser-
vices still have quantitative limits on advertising, and product placement rules are slightly 
more relaxed on VOD services, but they are similar, particularly the ones that limit the 
kinds of advertising services can accept and the special protections for minors. The draft-
ers have taken great care to define jurisdiction in a manner that will capture Google 
(YouTube), Facebook and other major US-based VSP companies in at least one member 
state.85 No changes to the AVMSD can do much to address the great imbalance between 
audiovisual media services and VSPs in their access to the kind of data, with consent, 
required for targeted advertising and the extent of their inventory. Because of this, it is 
not possible for the Directive to really level the playing field. Nevertheless, it has created 
more even treatment in terms of key rules affecting revenues and financial obligations, 
which may help European audiovisual media services be more competitive. The extent to 
which it protects them will depend significantly on how member states implement the 
provisions that allow them to impose contributions to funds for content production, and 
how they set up co-regulatory systems that will encompass the VSPs in the enforcement 
of advertising rules. 
                                               
85AVMSD 2018 adopted text (n 78) art 28b gives member states jurisdiction over a VSP via its 
parent company, or subsidiary or is part of its group is based there.  
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Another right for press publishers 
Unlike audiovisual media services, the press has never been the subject of sectoral regu-
lation at the EU level. Similar to online services until the AVMSD revision, the press 
does not face restrictions on content or advertising beyond general laws related to hate 
speech, libel and defamation. The Commission identified that the press publishers’ loss 
of revenue was attributable to their lack of bargaining power in relation to online services, 
and their inability to enforce their exclusive rights online.86 Rather than trying to inter-
vene in the conditions of competition for advertising, as the AVMSD does, or the funds 
available to invest in publishers’ content, the Commission has attempted to tackle the 
intermediary function of the platforms in the distribution of press publishers’ content, by 
adding a property right that can be exercised by publishers. The draft of the proposed new 
Copyright Directive includes a provision that creates a new layer of neighbouring rights 
over press publications online87 that was initially proposed for a period of twenty years, 
but then reduced to 2 years in the compromised text following the Trialogue,88 and which 
overlays the already existing rights in the publication.89 This section explains this attempt 
                                               
86Some academics link this proposal to two recent decisions by the CJEU in Case C572/13 
Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v Reprobel SCR [2015] EU:C:2015:750 and the Bun-
desgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice for Civil Matters) in Verlegeranteil, BGH 
GRUR 2016, 596. See Martin Kretschmer, Séverine Dusollier, Christiphe Geiger and P. 
Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘The European Commission’s public consultation on the role of pub-
lishers in the copyright value chain: a response by the European Copyright Society’ (2016) 
38 (10) EIPR 591. 
87Article 11(1) of the compromised Copyright Directive (n2). 
88Article 11(4) of the compromised Copyright Directive (n2).. 
89Compromised Copyright Directive (n 2). Further supported by European Commission, ‘Com-
mission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copy-
right rules Part 1/3’ SWD (2016) 301 final and European Commission, ‘Commission Staff 
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to change the balance of power and protect Europe’s news content production by intro-
ducing a new right, and why it is highly problematic and may backfire.  
In the print press industry, copyright has never played the central role that it cur-
rently does in other content industries.90 This does not mean that copyright pays no role 
whatsoever, but generally to recoup the investment in producing the physical paper and 
news within it, newspapers have sold advertising space within their pages.91 Their model 
relies on making their content accessible to subscribers, and to physical and online cus-
tomers, so as to achieve the highest reach possible, thereby being attractive for advertis-
ers. They do not typically deal in the sale or licensing of their content to others, and most 
have adapted to the spread of the internet by making all or some of their copyright-pro-
tected content freely available online on their own advertising-supported sites.  
The online environment is characterised by the use of linking and other technolo-
gies that enable the aggregation and display of snippets of copyright-protected content. 
As such, these activities may constitute acts of reproduction, making available to the pub-
lic and communication to the public which require the right-holder’s authorisation to 
avoid copyright infringement. The likelihood of these activities resulting into a copyright 
infringement is increased as copyright can be granted in short works including headlines 
and snippets as long as these meet the originality threshold.92 Nevertheless some of these 
                                               
Working Document Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules Part 
3/3’ SWD (2016) 301 final. 
90It remains key to remuneration in the music, and audiovisual industries.  
91In 1836, French newspaper ‘La Presse’ is supposed to be the first newspaper to include paid 
advertising. See for further detail: Dominique Kalifa, ’The Press’ in Edward Berenson et 
al. (eds), The French Republic: History, Value, Debates (Cornell University Press 2011) 
192, 193.  
92Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] EU:C:2009:465, 
where 11-word extracts were deemed as copyright infringement. 
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activities may be rendered permissible through the interplay of the quotation exception.93 
There are inherent difficulties in invoking this traditional exception in relation to these 
online uses because exceptions can only be used as a defence. Firstly, the quotation must 
relate to a copyright-protected work which has already been made lawfully available to 
the public. Secondly, the use must be in accordance to fair practice or national legal re-
quirements, which leads to a varied scope in different jurisdictions. Finally, the quotation 
exception has traditionally been conceived as involving some form of comment on the 
copyright-protected work reproduced. Therefore, an automated activity whereby an algo-
rithm ‘crawls’, collects, reproduces and communicates to the public excerpts of copy-
right-protected content is unlikely to be covered by this exception. Based on the above, 
press publishers already hold a strong position under copyright law. 
Despite the fact that the business model of the press industry is not centred on 
licensing and that publishers already have a legal basis upon which to address the issue 
of reproduction of their content by online platforms, the Commission identified that: 
“press publishers are facing difficulties in licensing their publications online and obtain-
ing a fair share of the value they generate” with consequences for their sustainability and 
ultimately citizens’ access to information.94 Its proposal to change the Copyright Di-
rective stated that licensing and enforcement of copyright for press publishers was made 
“complex and inefficient” by a lack of recognition for them as rights holders.95 Article 11 
of the proposal specifically extends Article 2 of the Copyright Directive, which currently 
                                               
93Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 (as amended on 28 
September 1979) (hereafter: ‘Berne Convention’); Directive 2001/29/EC (n 2) art. 5(3)(d). 
94Compromised Copyright Directive (n 2) p 3. 
95ibid, recital 31. 
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lists authors, performers, phonogram producers, film producers and broadcasters as hav-
ing exclusive reproduction rights, to press publishers. The Article also extends to pub-
lishers the rights to authorise or prohibit making their works available to the public.96 The 
move builds upon two national initiatives from Germany and Spain,97 and has proven 
extremely controversial.98  
Primarily, it is unlikely that the introduction of a new ancillary right will preserve 
media pluralism as presumed in the Commission’s proposal. This new right is more likely 
to have an adverse effect on media pluralism given that sharing news online would be 
subject to an additional license and/or fee as demonstrated in the Spanish and German 
cases.99 Here, news aggregators (like Google) decided to stop providing access to these 
newspapers’ content altogether. Therefore, in addition to a negative impact on the acces-
sibility of news online, in the Spanish and German cases the initiatives led to a decline in 
referrals to these newspapers’ websites. In turn, this decreased advertising revenues, an 
effect that was mostly felt by smaller news publishers.100 It would essentially exacerbate 
the problem identified earlier, of people not going directly to press publishers' websites, 
                                               
96These rights are in art 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
97For more on national initiatives, see Rupprecht Podszun, ‘Searching the future of newspapers: 
with a little help from Google and IP law?’ (2013) 44 (3) IIC 259; Rosati (n 14). 
98Study for the JURI Committee, ‘Strengthening the position of press publishers and authors and 
performers in the Copyright Directive’ (2017), p 17 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-
Data/etudes/STUD/2017/596810/IPOL_STU(2017)596810_EN.pdf>.  
99Sections 87f-h of the German Copyright Law (UrhG) and art. 32(2) of the Spanish Law on In-
tellectual Property. 
100The Impact Assessment itself acknowledges the limited effects of this new right in Germany 
and Spain. Characterising the right of ‘ineffective’ partly due to ‘the lack of scale of na-
tional solutions’. At this moment in time, it is still doubtful that a cross-border effect will 
prove to be more efficient.  
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rather than alleviate it. Secondly, there is justified scepticism surrounding the necessity 
of such ancillary right. Looking at industry practices, employed and freelance journalists 
rarely remain the owner of the copyright protection vested in their work as these economic 
rights are generally transferred to publishers.101 If the publishers already hold these rights 
and their enforcement of these rights is the issue, how will adding a layer of rights solve 
this problem? The approach being taken with Copyright Directive would attempt to in-
tervene in the relationship between press publishers and platforms, unlike the approach 
taken in the AVMSD, which equalises to some extent the conditions shaping the relation-
ships that audiovisual media services and VSPs each have with audiences and with ad-
vertisers.  
The Commission’s proposal is very broad in scope, as it would apply to all publi-
cations including blog posts, social media and other alike platforms,102 and therefore 
would affect all online users and not just address the use of press content by social media 
                                               
101Indeed, section 11 of the CDPA provides that the first owner of copyright is granted to the 
employer if the work has been created during the course of employment. Furthermore, 
freelance journalists generally transfer the ownership of economic rights through contrac-
tual agreements as per section 90 CDPA. 
102Article 2(4) of the proposed directive defines ‘press publication’ as: ‘a fixation of a collection 
of literary works of a journalistic nature, which may also comprise other works or subject-
matter and constitutes an individual item within a periodical or regularly-updated publica-
tion under a single title, such as a newspaper or a general or special interest magazine, 
having the purpose of providing information related to news or other topics and published 
in any media under the initiative, editorial responsibility and control of a service provider.’ 
Furthermore, recital 33 specifies that: ‘For the purposes of this Directive, it is necessary to 
define the concept of press publication in a way that embraces only journalistic publica-
tions, published by a service provider, periodically or regularly updated in any media, for 
the purpose of informing or entertaining. Such publications would include, for instance, 




news aggregators and search engines.103 In the compromised text, this has been tempered 
as the new press publishers right should not affect private individuals and non-commer-
cial uses and excludes very short extracts as well as hyperlinks. However, arguably, in-
formation society service providers (including platforms) are unlikely to be able to benefit 
from the eclusion for very short extracts.104 The new right would add a level of compli-
cation also for smaller platforms or media organisations that would have to clear content 
first, so this move aimed at redistributing revenue from the likes of Google and Facebook 
could have a much more harmful effect on smaller operations. The result of the introduc-
tion of this right could be a distortion of competition in the EU information market and 
higher barriers to entry into the online news market. Instead of facilitating licensing, this 
right would add complexity and increase the costs linked to the distribution of copyright-
protected content online.105  
There are also problems with this approach in relation to its scope, in particular 
the duration for which content is included and what kind of use exactly is covered. The 
term of protection of 2-3 years is still much longer than new remains relevant and on the 
                                               
103Critiques have also highlighted the fact that the extremely broad scope of this new right is 
likely to result in granting copyright protection in subject matter traditionally excluded 
from copyright protection by international treaties such as facts. See Berne Convention (n 
93).  
104 See Recital 34a of the compromised text that includes: 'Taking into account the massive ag-
gregation and use of press publications by information society service providers, it is im-
portant that the exclusion of very short extracts should be interpreted in such a way as not to 
affect the effectiveness of the rights provided for in this Directive'. 
105Furthermore, copyright remains territorial. Therefore, authors are not granted an EU-wide re-
production right but a reproduction right in each jurisdiction where protection is sought. 
This fragmentation increases the difficulties in licensing; Bently et al. (n 14). 
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agenda.106 If the lifespan of a news article can be characterised in days, weeks or months, 
what is the rationale for granting a right lasting for a long period. Much more considera-
tion of consumer habits, public interest and information rights are needed in these debates 
about duration. Despite the numerous debates, these questions of duration and scope all 
remain unanswered at present.107 Wheras as the new AVMSD attempts to equalise the 
conditions under which VSP compete for the attention of audiences by evening out many 
of the consumer protection measures, the creation of the press publishers right with a time 
frame of 2-3 years, is likely to actually disadvantage press publishers content in relation 
to audiences. 
The EU Parliament and the EU Council have explored alternatives, one of which 
is the possibility to introduce a presumption of representation of authors for the sake of 
rights enforcement.108 Drawing on national level initiatives, the idea here is to infer that 
news publishers have the relevant rights in the copyright-protected content to by-pass the 
need for publishers to have to establish that they are the owners of the rights for online 
enforcement.109 Such an option would have limited the additional burden to smaller 
                                               
106Christophe Geiger et al., ‘Opinion of the Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies 
(CEIPI) at the University of Strasbourg on the European Commission’s copyright reform 
proposal, with a focus on the introduction of neighbouring rights for press publishers in 
EU law’ (2016) CEIPI Research Paper No. 2016-01 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2921334##>. It was sent to the European Commission on 2 Decem-
ber 2016. 
107Frosio et al. (n 14) 208-209. 
108European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Draft Report on the proposal for a di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market (COM(2016)0593 – C8-0383/2016 – 2016/0280(COD))’ (2016) 2016/0280 COD 
(limiting the new right to 1 year since publication); such proposal is presumably based on 
a strengthening of article 5 of Directive 2004/48/EC. 
109Study for the JURI Committee (n 98) 15. 
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online services and new entrants, but it is also not likely to help press publishers to secure 
a stronger bargaining position or recoup part of the revenue lost to the digital consump-
tion.110 Intervening with the addition of an additional layer of property rights on content 
holds little promise for addressing the problem of press publishers not getting a “fair share 
of the value” from their content, while, as several have argued, it could have negative 
consequences for freedom of expression.111  
Conclusion 
As it becomes harder for traditional media companies to secure the same amount of ad-
vertising income as in the analogue age, the future of advertising-financed content pro-
duced by traditional players will be increasingly threatened.112 As was the case in the 
1980s, once again the threat is perceived as coming in the form of powerful US based 
companies that are bigger and better resourced than anything in Europe. These dynamics 
could be viewed as broader problems, and threats global platforms pose to traditional 
media in the US have also been recognised by scholars and industry monitors there.113 
                                               
110The Impact Assessment acknowledges this too.  
111Is there a pressing social need justifying the introduction of this right and therefore, the cur-
tailing of the right to freedom of expression? Here, scholars have expressed criticisms. van 
Eechoud (n 14) 18-24; Study for the Juri Committee (n 98) 24; Pihlajarinne and Vesala (n 
14) 220-228. 
112ibid. 
113 For a study examining the impact of social media platforms and technology companies 
on the sustainability of ‘traditional press publishers’, see: Emily Bell et al., ‘The Platform 
Press – How Silicon Valley Reengineered Journalism’ (Tow Center for Digital Journal-
ism at Columbia Journalism School, 2017) <https://doi.org/10.7916/D8R216ZZ>. See 
also: Nushin Rashidian et al., ‘Friend and Foe: The Platform Press at the Heart of Jour-




However in the context of EU policy process, they have been framed as about the health 
of European content production and even European culture. The approaches being taken 
in the AVMSD and the Copyright Directive to deal with these threats are very different. 
The new AVMSD continues with trying to establish fair common rules for competition 
and imposing obligations to invest in content production. It has been revised with the 
intention of ‘levelling up’ the common standards for audiovisual media services, applying 
most of them to the online VOD services and VSPs. Policymakers have sought to redress 
the imbalance in the market for advertising budgets by extending the limitations audio-
visual media services face to these US based companies.114 It essentially intervenes in the 
relationship between VSPs and advertisers in an attempt to approximate it to that between 
audiovisual media services and advertisers, while getting closer to matching the obliga-
tions on those carrying professionally produced content (as opposed to user-generated 
content) to contribute to the production of European content. Though as noted above there 
are uncertainties and even dangers in how the final revision has been worded in relation 
to the potential for states to impose levies and the flexibility of co-regulation, there is 
more potential for the AVMSD to go some way towards ensuring revenues for traditional 
content producers than would the proposed changes to the Copyright Directive.  
The compromised text of the Copyright Directive would add a press publishers 
right with the hope that this will facilitate the licensing of EU works online and bring 
additional revenues to press publishers. It would intervene in the relationship between 
press publishers and the various online platforms, mainly US-based companies rather 
than in the relationships through which press publishers currently derive revenues. It will 
not affect the rules of the game in which the press publishers and platforms compete for 
                                               
114Except for the quantitative rules, which still apply only to linear services.  
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advertising revenue, nor will it create new obligations for platforms to invest in content. 
The extra layer of intended protection for press publishers is not matched by incentives 
for the platforms to carry press publishers content, and given the existing imbalance of 
power, it is likely to have an effect opposite that which is intended. In fact, the press 
publishers already have rights that could be relied upon to serve that function, and these 
have not worked, so there is little reason to expect a new right would. 
Fundamentally behind the strength of advertising dependent online platforms is 
the data they hold on their users and their nearly limitless advertising inventory. No pro-
visions in the AVMSD or the introduction of a press publisher’s right will rectify this. A 
closer look at the ‘walled gardens’ of user data and measurement metrics might identify 
places where other interventions might be applied to redress some of the imbalance. If 
European policymakers want to improve and protect the share of their content’s value 
that press publishers are receiving, they should examine the trading practices of program-
matic advertising and the levels of concentration within that ecosystem. Using a levelling 
approach similar to that taken in the AVMSD, in relation to transparency, taxation, and 
data, or perhaps applying competition or commercial practices rules, might do much more 
to help press publishers recoup some of their position in advertising markets. 
The different nature of the viewer experience and the continued recognition of 
some long-term effects of long form, mass advertising (i.e. on TV) means that audiovisual 
media services are not as threatened as press publishers. They are also adapting by launch-
ing more targeted and interactive options, and the companies behind them are themselves 
getting into the game of adtech, diversifying their holdings in attempts to match the con-
centration along the value chain that the large US players such as Google already have. 
Press publishers are also trying to adapt, but it may be that advertising revenue streams 
for press publishers will dry up, or at least no longer be able to provide sufficient funding 
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to support the kind of content needed. In the tradition of supporting the use of state aid 
for press publishing there may need to be more funds for supporting press content,115 
particularly news, in the model of the funds for supporting audiovisual content, perhaps 
like the EU level Creative Europe programme or even involving levies on platforms like 
those now allowed by the AVMSD. There could be forms of quotas for European news 
content that could be imposed on aggregators or other platforms coupled with obligations 
to contribute in a manner similar to those the AVMSD contains for VOD services. In 
order to protect European content production in the face of global online platforms, Eu-
ropean policymakers will need to pay close attention to how the AVMSD is implemented, 
offering the right guidance as to which platforms count as VSP and how co-regulatory 
regimes are shaped. At the same time, should the press publisher’s right fail to have the 
effect of increasing revenues for press publishers, which seems likely, they should look 
towards the protectionist measures that have been long used in the audiovisual arena for 
options.  
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115 For example, the ‘Cairncross Review’ in the UK, which is looking at how to sustain the pro-
duction and distribution of high-quality journalism has consulted on the option of some 
kind of subsidy. For further detail see The Cairncross Review, ‘A sustainable future for 
journalism’ (HM Government, 12 February 2019) <https://assets.publishing.ser-
vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/779882/021919_DCMS_Cairncross_Review_.pdf>  
